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How do reward outcomes affect early visual performance? Previous studies found a suboptimal influence, but they ignored the
non-linearity in how subjects perceived the reward outcomes. In contrast, we find that when the non-linearity is accounted for,
humans behave optimally and maximize expected reward. Our subjects were asked to detect the presence of a familiar target
object in a cluttered scene. They were rewarded according to their performance.We systematically varied the target frequency
and the reward/penalty policy for detecting/missing the targets. We find that 1) decreasing the target frequency will decrease
the detection rates, in accordance with the literature. 2) Contrary to previous studies, increasing the target detection rewards
will compensate for target rarity and restore detection performance. 3) A quantitative model based on reward maximization
accurately predicts human detection behavior in all target frequency and reward conditions; thus, reward schemes can be
designed to obtain desired detection rates for rare targets. 4) Subjects quickly learn the optimal decision strategy; we propose
a neurally plausible model that exhibits the same properties. Potential applications include designing reward schemes to
improve detection of life-critical, rare targets (e.g., cancers in medical images).
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Introduction
The behavioral and neural mechanisms of reward or
value-based economic decision making (Kahneman &
Tversky, 2000; Sugrue, Corrado, & Newsome, 2005) and
sensory-based decision making (Gold & Shadlen, 2007;
Green & Swets, 1966) have been extensively studied in
humans and animals. In comparison, much less is known
about how reward combines with sensory information
(likelihood and prior) to guide decisions. Here, we
investigate sensory-economic decision making in the
context of a visual search task where a familiar target
object must be found in a cluttered scene with several
distracting objects. Humans and animals rely on visual
search to detect food, mates, and predators. Much research
in visual search behavior has focused on the role of
sensory information such as salience of the target (Itti &
Koch, 2001; Nothdurft, 1992); amount of background
clutter in terms of number (Treisman & Gelade, 1980),
heterogeneity (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Rosenholtz,
2001) of distracting objects; and knowledge of target and
distractor statistics (Navalpakkam & Itti, 2007; Vickery,
King, & Jiang, 2005). In contrast, the role of reward
outcomes in visual search behavior is relatively unknown.
A recent study (Wolfe, Horowitz, & Kenner, 2005)
shows that target frequency plays an important role in
visual search performance. While earlier research was
limited to stimuli with high target frequencies (typically
50%; Palmer, Verghese, & Pavel, 2000; Treisman &
Gelade, 1980), this study tested subjects on a range of
target frequencies as low as 1% and found an alarming drop
in target detection rates as target frequency decreased.
Several attempts to improve the detection rates, such
as encouraging subjects to slow down, or by increasing
the frequency of the target category, failed (Wolfe et al.,
2007). This raises concern for life-critical searches such
as detecting rare diseases in medical images (some
types of cancer have 0.3% frequency; Gur et al., 2004)
and detecting weapons in airline passenger luggage
(Rubenstein, 2001). Here, we investigate whether
changing the reward outcomes (e.g., increasing the reward
received upon finding the target and increasing penalties
upon missing the target) can improve detection rates.
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Earlier studies in signal detection considered reward
payoff manipulations (Green & Swets, 1966; Healy &
Kubovy, 1981; Kubovy & Healy, 1977; Lee & Janke,
1964, 1965; Lee & Zentall, 1966; Maddox, 2002) but only
for high or medium target frequencies (mostly 50%, some
10–25%). Two robust findings emerged:
1. the decision criterion was more conservative than
the optimal decision criterion (i.e., shifted toward
fewer target detections),
2. changing the target frequency, but not reward, lead
to near-optimal shifts in the decision criterion.
These studies found, contrary to the assumption in
standard economic theories, that subjects do not maximize
expected reward. These studies tested subjects on simple
tasks such as whether the stimulus at a single location
contained a target or not. Here, we test subjects’ perfor-
mance in more complex tasks such as whether a multi-
item display contains a target or not. In Experiment 1, we
replicate the previous findings that changing sensory
priors (target frequency) causes an optimal shift in the
decision criterion, while reward has a suboptimal effect.
However, this result is confounded by the subject’s non-
linear utility function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953), rendering subject’s
perceived reward different from the objective reward
value. In Experiments 2 and 3, we redesign the visual
search task as a contest between subjects, with an attractive
cash prize for the winner. Under such competitive settings
that encourage a literal interpretation of the reward
scheme, we find that subjects maximize expected reward
per trial and operate at the optimal decision criterion. In
Learning the optimal decision criterion section, we report
that when confronted with any new target frequency and
reward scheme, subjects learn the optimal decision
criterion rapidly. We propose and simulate neurally
plausible models of such rapid reward-based learning.
We conclude in the Discussion section, by illustrating how
reward schemes may be designed to improve, and to yield
desired target detection rates for any target frequency, and
outline potential applications of our findings.
Effect of reward and target
frequency
Experiment 1
We asked subjects to detect an oddly oriented line in
briefly flashed pictures containing a number of parallel
lines (Figure 1a). Detecting a target when none is present
is called a ‘false alarm’ error, while failing to detect a
target when one is present is called a ‘miss’ error. We
measured the frequency of these errors as a function of the
target frequency (50%, 10%, 2%) and of the reward
structure. As indicated in Table 1, we experimented with
two reward schemes: in Experiment 1A, the reward was
‘Neutral’, i.e., both types of errors were equally penalized
and both types of correct responses were equally
rewarded. In Experiment 1B, missing a target was
penalized much more seriously than generating a false
alarm (we call this the ‘Airport’ reward scheme as missing
a bomb hidden in a suitcase is prohibitively expensive
compared to false alarms that result in a relatively quick
manual inspection). We also tested a third reward scheme
‘Gain’ (Table 1c) where subjects gained much more when
they correctly detected the target than when they correctly
rejected it.
Four naive subjects (Caltech students and postdocs,
with normal or corrected vision) participated with
informed consent and IRB approval. They received paid
compensation of /15.50/hour for their participation. In
addition, in Experiment 1, subjects were paid one cent for
each point earned during the experiment (/0 if the total
points earned was negative). The display size was 28 
21 degrees and each stimulus was 2  0.2 degrees in
size. In Experiments A and B, each trial began with a
central fixation cross (for 250 ms), followed by the
search display (for 50 ms), followed by a blank (until
SOA), and the mask (until keypress). The search display
contained 12 oriented bars arranged in a ring around the
center (eccentricity 6 degrees) with additional spatial
jitter up to 0.5 degrees. The target was always oriented
at 70 degrees (from the horizontal) and the distractors
were oriented at 60 degrees. The mask contained the target
and distractor superimposed at each location. Each trial
was a yes/no task where the subject had to respond either
target present or absent. The trial timed out at 4 s with the
wrong response, to prevent subjects from avoiding
response. At the end of each trial, subjects received
feedback on the reward earned on the trial, as well
aggregate reward earned on the block.
Experiments 1A and 1B were divided into multiple
sessions (lasting up to an hour a day), each consisting of
blocks of 100 trials each. Subjects completed all blocks in
one experimental condition (a particular combination of
target frequency and reward scheme), before proceeding
to the next. Each subject performed 3 blocks (300 trials)
in the 50% target frequency condition, and 3 blocks (300
trials) in the 10% condition. The sequence of experimental
conditions was randomized across subjects, and subjects
saw different random sequences of target present and
absent displays (an average of 150 targets in the 50%
target frequency condition, and 30 targets in the 10%
condition).
The experiments began with a procedure to calibrate
SOA. To become familiar with the task, subjects were
trained on the 50% target frequency trials in the Neutral
reward scheme with decreasing SOAs (starting from
500 ms and decreasing in steps of 50 ms as subjects
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improved) until detection rates stabilized at 75–80%. The
SOA was thereafter fixed at the stabilized value for the
entire session. Task performance is known to improve with
practice over days (Goldstone, 1998), hence to equate task
difficulty in the 50% Neutral reward condition across all
sessions, we repeated the SOA calibration procedure at the
beginning of each day’s session. The SOAs for subjects
ranged from 100 to 200 ms.
Before the start of a new experimental condition, subjects
received one block of training (100 trials) to become
familiar with the new target frequency or reward scheme.
During training (as well as the main experiment), subjects
received feedback on reward earned per trial, so they could
adjust their decision criterion C to optimize reward.
Results
In Experiment 1A, we found that for a fixed reward
structure (Neutral), as the target frequency decreases from
50% to 10% the detection rate (pooled across subjects)
decreases significantly (p-value G 0.05, two-tailed t-test)
from close to 75% down to 55% (Figure 1, light gray bars;
mean T standard error in detection rates for 50% and 10%
target frequencies are 73 T 4% and 56 T 4%). This
replicates the finding by Wolfe et al. (2005) that detection
rates drop as the target frequency decreases. In Experi-
ment 1B, we studied the effect of changing the reward
structure from Neutral to Airport (Table 1b) when the
target frequency decreases to 10% (infrequent). We found
r00 (Correct rejection) r01 (False alarm) r10 (Miss) r11 (Correct detection/hit)
(a) Neutral +1 j50 j50 +1
(b) Airport +1 j50 j900 +100
(c) Gain +1 j50 j50 +950
Table 1. Reward schemes. The numbers inside the boxes indicate rewards (positive numbers) and penalties (negative numbers) in
arbitrary units. r00 refers to the reward upon correctly rejecting the target when it is absent; r01 is the penalty upon falsely reporting a target;
r10 is the penalty for missing the target when it is present; r11 is the reward for correctly detecting the target when it is present. (a) Neutral
reward schemeVequal penalty on both false alarm and miss errors. (b) Airport reward schemeVsevere penalty on miss errors
compared to false alarms. (c) Gain reward schemeVgenerous reward for finding the target compared to correct rejection.
Figure 1. (a) Stimulus used in Experiments 1 and 2. Subjects were instructed to search for the target bar (oriented 70- clockwise from the
horizontal) among eleven distractor bars (oriented 60-). Each display was presented briefly (Palmer et al., 2000; 100–200 ms SOA, to
minimize eye movements) and was followed by a mask (Braun, 1994). After the mask appeared, subjects were asked to respond whether
the target was present or not. Subjects received feedback on correct and incorrect responses. (b) Results from Experiment 1: In the
Neutral reward scheme, target detection rates dropped as the target frequency decreased from 50% to 10%. Changing the reward
scheme from Neutral to Airport did not significantly improve the detection rates in the 10% target frequency condition.
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that the detection rate increases but not significantly
(p-value 9 0.05, two-tailed t-test; Figure 1, red bars;
detection rates for 10% target frequency is 62 T 7%).
Ideal observer model
To gain a quantitative understanding of the influence of
target frequency and reward on detection performance, we
turn to an ideal observer that maximizes the expected
reward per trial. We use signal detection theory (Green &
Swets, 1966) to model the ideal observer. Note that there
exist alternate theories based on sequential analysis (for
review, see Bogacz et al., 2006) to model speed-accuracy
tradeoffs and reaction time measures. However, since ours
is a brief fixed length display paradigm (100–150 ms
SOA) without significant differences in reaction time, we
follow previous literature in brief display paradigms
Figure 2. Ideal observer model. This figure illustrates our model and shows how an ideal observer would shift the decision criterion in the
10% target frequency (Neutral reward) condition to maximize expected reward per trial. (a) The two curves represent the distribution of
decision variable values when the target is absent (dashed line, left) and present (solid line, right) in the display (dV= 1.52, see Comparing
subjects and ideal observers section for details on how they are obtained from subject’s data). The two vertical lines represent different
decision criteria C: the green criterion produces equal number of missed targets and false alarms, while the red criterion generates few
false alarms at the expense of more missed targets. (b) The tradeoff between missed targets and false alarms for different criteria can be
visualized using an ROC curve (the two dots are color coded to correspond to the two criteria in (a)). As the decision criterion shifts to the
right in (a), the observer moves down the ROC curve in (b), resulting in more misses than false alarms. (c) The expected reward for each
trial (E[R]), which depends on the number of missed targets and false alarms and their costs (see Equation 1), is shown in this color-
coded map. The red color indicates high expected reward values, while blue indicates low values. The ideal observer (red symbol)
operates at the point of maximum expected reward on the ROC curve (shown in white). (d) The gray curves show the distribution of
decision variables d to target present (solid) and absent displays (dashed) as in (a). The expected reward for different choices of the
decision criterion is superimposed (thick black line). The expected reward increases as the decision criterion shifts to the right and then
decreases. Hence the ideal observer shifts his/her criterion slightly to the right (from the point of intersection of curves P(dªT = 1)
and P(dªT = 0)) to maximize reward. The error bar denotes standard error of the mean reward (SEM) and the red line indicates the range
of decision criteria that lead to maximum E[R] TSEM.
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(Palmer et al., 2000; Verghese & Stone, 1995) and use
signal detection theory to model our ideal observer. We
explain the theory below (illustrated in Figure 2a). Each
display is represented internally by a single number, the
decision variable d (see Comparing subjects and ideal
observers section for details of the decision variable). The
observer maintains a fixed internal representation of
decision variables in target present and absent displays
(Comparing subjects and ideal observers section explains
how this internal representation may be obtained from
subject’s data; for now, let us assume these are known).
The observer uses a linear discrimination threshold as a
decision criterion (C) to distinguish between likelihood of
target presence (P(dªT = 1)) vs. absence (P(dªT = 0))
in the display (Palmer et al., 2000). Upon seeing a
new display, the observer decides whether the target
is present or absent by checking whether the
observed decision variable d exceeds the decision
criterion C. Detection performance varies as the
decision criterion changes and is visualized by the
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve that
plots the probability of correct detection (hit) (PCD)
vs. false alarm (PFA) for all possible values of the
decision criterion C (Figure 2b).
How does an ideal observer behave according to this
model? The ideal observer will choose the decision
criterion C that maximizes the expectation of reward at
each trial. The expected reward per trial E[R] can be
computed for different points on the ROC curve (PFA,
PCD) explicitly by summing the four possible outcomes,
each weighted by the probability of the corresponding
event as described in Table 1. Refer to Table 1 for notation.
P1 is the probability of target presence (P0 = 1 j P1 is that
of target absence):
E½R ¼ r11P1PCD þ r10P1ð1jPCDÞ þ r01P0PFA
þ r00P0ð1jPFAÞ: ð1Þ
Note that both PCD and PFA are functions of C. The ideal
observer will choose a value of C that produces PCD and
PFA such that the previous expression is maximized.
Figures 2c and 2d illustrate this. As seen in Figure 2c,
for low target frequency (10%) conditions in the Neutral
reward scheme, the expected reward per trial (E[R]) is
higher in the middle left region of the ROC curve. Hence,
the optimal behavioral strategy is to operate at the middle
left on the ROC curve. This is better visualized in Figure 2d,
where E[R] is shown as a function of the decision criterion
C. To maximize E[R], the ideal observer would shift the
decision criterion C slightly to the right (from the point of
intersection of curves P(dªT = 1) and P(dªT = 0)), similar
to the red line in Figure 2a. Consequently, the false alarms
decrease and the detection rates are poor (red symbol in
Figure 2b). Thus, the ideal observer theory predicts that
detection performance for rare targets will be poor (as
observed in previous studies (Wolfe et al., 2005) and
replicated here). In the next section, we compare the
behavior of the ideal observer and our subjects.
Comparing subjects and ideal observers
For each subject and the average subject, we computed
the best fitting ROC curve across all experimental
conditions (50%, 10% Neutral, and 10% Airport) as
follows. We assumed that the sensory response to a
stimulus at the ith location (iZ {1I12}) is drawn from a
Gaussian distribution, xi È G(2, A) (2 = 1 for the target,
and 2 = 0 for the distractor). Next, we assumed that the
display is represented internally as a single number, the
decision variable d. Examples of decision variables for
our yes/no visual search task include the maximum
response at all locations in the display (Palmer, Ames, &
Lindsey, 1993; Verghese, 2001), the likelihood ratio of
target presence vs. absence in the display (see ideal
observer, A.2.3, (Palmer et al., 2000); for use of the ideal
rule in2AFC tasks and cueing tasks, seeEckstein, Shimozaki,
& Abbey, 2002; Schoonveld, Shimozaki, & Eckstein,
2007). We choose the latter as it is the ideal rule to
integrate information across the display. According to this
rule, the likelihood of target presence (or absence) in the
display can be expressed in terms of the likelihood of target
presence (or absence) at each location. Let T = 1 represent
target presence in the display (T = 0 denotes target absence)
and let Ti = 1 represent target presence at the ith location in
the display (Ti = 0 denotes target absence):
PðxkT ¼ 0Þ ¼
Y12
i¼1








P xikTi ¼ 1ð Þ
Y
jmi
P xikTi ¼ 0ð Þ
assuming target is equally likely to appear anywhereð Þ;
ð3Þ







PðxikTi ¼ 0Þ :
ð4Þ
Thus the decision variable (likelihood of target presence
vs. absence in the display) equals the sum of likelihood
ratios of the target presence vs. absence at each location in
the display. In this model, we assume that the observer has
a fixed internal representation of the values of the decision
variable in target present and absent displays (P(dªT = 1),
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P(dªT = 0)) and varies the decision criterion C to operate
at different points on the ROC curve. We find the best
fitting ROC curve through a maximum likelihood estima-
tion procedure that determines the value of A that
maximizes the likelihood of subject’s data. The resulting
ROC curves are asymmetric (Figure 2b), as reflected by
the difference in shape of the distributions of decision
variables to target present vs. absent displays (Figure 2a).
Such asymmetric ROCs have also been observed in other
studies (Wolfe et al., 2007).
Do subjects behave as ideal observers? To test this, we
compared our subjects’ reward to that of the ideal
observer. We find that for different target frequencies
(50%, 10%) in the Neutral reward scheme (i.e., the
default, symmetric reward scheme), subjects operate in
the region of maximum reward (Figures 3b and 3c)Vthere
is no difference between subject reward and maximum
expected reward (z-test, p-value 9 0.05). This replicates
previous findings (Green & Swets, 1966; Healy &
Kubovy, 1981; Kubovy & Healy, 1977; Lee & Janke,
1964, 1965; Lee & Zentall, 1966; Maddox, 2002) that
changing the sensory prior (target frequency) causes an
optimal shift in the decision criterion. In contrast, we find
that changing the reward scheme from Neutral to Airport
for a fixed target frequency (10%) yields a suboptimal
shift in the decision criterion (Figures 3c and 3d)V
subjects fail to maximize expected reward in the 10%
Airport condition (they have fewer target detections and
fewer false alarms than the ideal observer). These results
confirm previous findings (Green & Swets, 1966; Healy &
Kubovy, 1981; Kubovy & Healy, 1977; Lee & Janke,
1964, 1965; Lee & Zentall, 1966; Maddox, 2002) that
subjects adjust optimally to changes in target frequency,
but they adjust suboptimally to changes in the reward
scheme.
Experiment 2: Contest between subjects
It is somewhat surprising that changing the reward
scheme in Experiment 1 did not lead to a significant
improvement in target detection performance, especially
since several economic theories assume humans to be
reward or utility-maximizing agents (von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1953). One possible reason for the small
effect of reward is that the reward values, rij (i, jZ {0, 1})
in Equation 1, are perceived differently by the subjects
(not as the objective reward value set by the experimenter)
Figure 3. Experiment 1: Comparing subject behavior to the ideal observer. (a) ROC curve. Averaged subject behavior (n = 4) in the 50%
and the 10% Neutral and in the 10% Airport conditions fits well to an ROC curve. (b–c) Changing the target frequency yields an optimal
shift in the decision criterion. For each target frequency in the Neutral reward condition, we show the expected reward per trial for different
points on the ROC curve. The operating point of the average subject (shown in big colored symbols) lies in the region of maximum reward
(shown in red line)Vthe subject’s reward is statistically indistinguishable (z-test, significance level 0.05, p-value indicated in the title of
each panel) from the maximum reward (mean TSEM, shown with thin black error bars). Similar results are obtained for the individual
subjects. This shows that for different target frequencies in the Neutral reward scheme, subjects operate at the optimal decision criterion
that maximizes expected reward per trial. (d) Changing the reward payoff scheme yields a suboptimal shift in the decision criterion.
Subjects do not maximize expected reward when the reward scheme changes from Neutral to Airport for a fixed target frequency (10%).
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due to filtering through a subjective utility function. Costs
and benefits perceived by humans are not linearly related
to monetary rewards; in particular, the utility of a dollar
gained is typically lower than the negative utility of a
dollar lost (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and the utility of
a dollar diminishes with increasing gains (von Neumann
& Morgenstern, 1953). Such non-linearity confounds the
results from previous studies (replicated in Experiment 1)
as the observed suboptimality (failure to maximize
expected reward) may be due to the diminished utility of
the reward values (e.g., a reward value of 100 points
perceived as less than 100). A diminished value of reward
and penalties is consistent with the conservative strategy
(low detection rates and low false alarms) adopted by
subjects in Experiment 1 (and previous studies).
To encourage subjects to follow our reward scheme
faithfully, we redesigned each experimental condition as a
contest among subjects: the sum of the gains and losses in
each experimental condition was used as a score. The
subject with the highest score in each condition won /50
(in addition to the regular hourly pay of /15.50). Subjects
were unaware of each other’s performance. Subjects may
lose the contest even after earning 1000 points, hence in
order to win, subjects must not diminish their effort or
utility and must use the reward values literally in order to
maximize their scores. In Experiment 2, we repeated
Experiment 1 (on the same subjects) under such com-
petitive settings. In addition to 50% and 10% target
frequency, we also tested subjects at 2% target frequency.
In addition to one block of training, each subject
performed 3 blocks of 300 trials in total in the 50%,
10% target frequency conditions, 10 blocks of 1000 trials
in total, containing an average of 20 target present trials in
the 2% target frequency condition.
Results
In Experiment 2A, we found that for a symmetric
reward structure (Neutral), as the target frequency
decreases from 50% to 2% the detection rate (pooled
across subjects) decreases significantly (p-value G 0.05,
two-tailed t-test) from close to 80% down to 30% (Figure 4,
light gray bars; mean T standard error in detection rates
for 50%, 10%, and 2% target frequencies are 78 T 1%,
58 T 4%, and 29 T 4% respectively). This replicates the
finding by Wolfe et al. (2005) that rare targets are often
missed. In Experiment 2B, we studied the effect of
changing the reward structure from Neutral to Airport
(Table 1b) when the target frequency decreases to 10%
(infrequent) and 2% (rare). We found that the detection
rate increases significantly (more than double when the
target is rare), restoring performance to levels statistically
indistinguishable from the 50% target frequency condition
(Figure 4, red bars; detection rates for 10% and 2% target
frequencies are 77 T 3% and 61 T 11%). In fact, in two
out of four subjects, the detection rate in the 10% Airport
condition was significantly higher than in the 50%
Neutral condition. This shows that reward can signifi-
cantly influence target detection performance.
Next, we investigate to what extent the ideal observer
model can account for subject’s behavior. We find that a
single ROC curve fits our subjects’ behavior well in different
reward and target frequency conditions (Figure 5a, dV= 1.52)
and allows good quantitative predictions as shown below.
When target frequency decreases, subjects move down the
ROC curve toward lower detection and lower false alarm
rates. In contrast, when reward changes from the Neutral
to the Airport scheme, subjects move up along the ROC
curve toward higher detection and false alarm rates. This
suggests that the internal representation of the stimulus
display (P(dªT = 0), P(dªT = 1)) remains the same across
all conditionsVi.e., the subjects’ attention/arousal levels
remain the sameVbut the decision criterion changes.
Can the ideal observer model predict subject’s behavior
quantitatively? Our results show that subjects operate in
the region of maximum reward (Figures 5b–5f)Vthere is
no difference between subject’s reward and maximum
expected reward (z-test, p-value 9 0.05). Not only does
this show that our model predicts subject’s data well, but
also that the behavior of subjects is optimal, i.e., subjects
maximize expected reward per trial.
Subjects’ behavior in the Airport reward scheme
(Experiment 2B) may be interpreted as avoiding losses,
as the penalty on missing the target is much higher than
the penalty on a false alarm error. To test whether subjects
Figure 4. Results of Experiment 2. This figure shows that in the
Neutral reward condition (gray bars), target detection rates drop
significantly when the target becomes rare. However, changing
the reward scheme from Neutral to Airport (red bars) yields a
significant increase in detection rates, showing that reward has a
strong influence on detection performance.
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are avoiding losses, or seeking gains, or both, we designed
a ‘Gain’ reward scheme (Experiment 2C, Table 1) where
the gain on correctly detecting the target is much higher
than the gain on correctly rejecting it, and the penalty on
miss and false alarm errors is equal. In this new reward
scheme that emphasized gains rather than losses, we
found again that subjects maximize their expected gain
(Figure 6). Experiments 2B and 2C together show that
subjects avoid losses, as well as seek gains; in other
words, they maximize the overall expected reward.
Next, we tested whether subject’s decisions could be
explained purely based on sensory information (by
ignoring rewards, i.e., setting rij = k in Equation 1), or
reward information (value-based choice that ignores
sensory information, i.e., setting P(dªT = 0) = P(dªT = 1)
or PCD = PFA in Equation 1). As seen in Figure 7, we find
that only a model that combines sensory and reward
information optimally can explain subject’s data across all
Figure 5. Experiment 2: Comparing subject’s behavior to the ideal observer. (a) ROC curve. Subject’s behavior (average as well as
individual data) in different frequency and reward conditions fits well to an ROC curve. Only the averaged subject data are shown here
due to space constraints. (b–f) Subjects maximize expected reward per trial. For each reward and target frequency condition, we show the
expected reward per trial for different points on the ROC curve. The operating point of the average subject (shown in big colored symbols)
lies in the region of maximum reward (shown in red line)Vthe subject’s reward is statistically indistinguishable (z-test, significance level
0.05) from the maximum reward (mean TSEM, shown in black error bars). Similar results are obtained for average as well as individual
subject data.
Figure 6. Subjects maximize expected gain. As in Figure 5d
where subjects avoid losses in the Airport reward scheme, here
(10% target frequency, Gain scheme) we find that the average
subject (n = 4) maximizes expected gain per trial. Similar results
are obtained for the individual subjects.
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target frequencies and reward schemes. Thus, subjects in
our experiments are combining sensory priors and reward
outcomes optimally, rather than purely sensory or eco-
nomic decision making.
Learning the optimal decision
criterion
Subject learning rates
In our experiments under competitive settings (Experi-
ments 2A and 2B), we find that humans deploy the
optimal decision criterion Copt that maximizes expected
reward per trial. This suggests that humans learned Copt
within the block of 100 trials of training that they received
at the beginning of each experimental condition (i.e.,
before the start of a new combination of reward scheme
and target frequency). We analyzed the training data as
follows. For each experimental condition, we determined
the correct detection/hit (PCD) and false alarm rates (PFA)
as a function of the number of trials seen in the training
sequence, used these to determine subject’s reward using
Equation 1, and asked when the subject’s reward becomes
statistically indistinguishable from the ideal observer’s
reward (z-test, significance level 0.05). Analysis of the
training data reveals that on average, subjects learned Copt
rapidly, within 14, 31, 7, 24, and 42 trials in the 50%,
10%, 2% Neutral, and 10%, 2% Airport conditions,
respectively. What are the underlying computational and
neural mechanisms of such rapid reward-based learning?
How much information does a learner need to determine
the optimal decision criterion (e.g., can the learner
perform well without full knowledge of the statistics of
responses in target present and absent displays)? How
much memory does a learner need to determine and
maintain the optimal decision criterion? In the next
section, we address these issues and propose a neurally
plausible model of learning.
Models of learning
We simulate five different models of learning: 1) fully
informed, ideal observer who operates at the optimal
decision criterion Copt, 2) optimal learner (with perfect and
infinite memory), 3) bio learner (neurally plausible
implementation of the optimal learner), 4) unit memory
learner (who decides based on the previous trial only), 5)
finite memory learners (who decide based on the previous
32, 64, and 128 trials). All model learners except the bio
learner have perfect memory but with varying memory
capacity (i.e., number of previous trials in memory). We
explain each model below.
The ideal observer knows everything about the experi-
ment except the ground truth of whether the target is
present or absent on every trial (Ti = 1 if the target is
present on the ith trial). Thus, the ideal observer knows
the probability density of responses in the target present
P(dªT = 1) È G(21, A1) and absent displays P(dªT = 0) È
G(20, A0); the target frequency P1; and the reward
structure (r00, r01, r10, r11). This observer can compute
the optimal decision criterion Copt that maximizes
expected reward E[R] (Equation 1) using gradient ascent
or other optimization techniques. This may be done ahead
of seeing the stimulus, thus the ideal observer behaves
optimally from the beginning.
Unlike the ideal observer with full knowledge, other
models do not know the display statistics (distribution of
decision variable values when the target is present or
absent in the display), or target frequency. They only
know the values of the decision variable, the ground truth
(is the target present or not), and reward feedback in
previously seen n trials (n = 1,32,64,128 for the finite
memory learners, and infinite for the optimal learner).
Rather than a slow process of explicitly learning the target
frequency or display statistics, then determining the
expected reward profile, and subsequently finding its peak
through gradient ascent (or some optimization method),
the models use a faster algorithm explained below.
The optimal learner (Figure 8) knows much less than
an ideal observerVit knows only the ground truth Ti and
Figure 7. Subjects combine sensory evidence with reward
optimally. Can subjects’ decisions be explained by purely sensory
or economic decision making models? To test this, we compare
the predictions of three models of decision making based on 1)
sensory evidence, 2) reward information, and 3) optimal combina-
tion of both. We test the ability of these models to predict subject’s
expected reward in different target frequency and reward
schemes. The stars indicate significant difference between mod-
el’s prediction and subject’s reward (single star: p-value G 0.05,
two stars: p-value G 0.01, three stars: p-value G 0.001). Subject
data across all conditions are best explained by a model that
combines sensory and reward information optimally.
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reward feedback in n trials seen so far, and the
corresponding values of the decision variable (diªTi, iZ
{1, n}). We call it the optimal learner as it learns Copt in a
minimum number of trials (and using few parameters).
For each decision criterion C, the optimal learner com-
putes the total reward Ri(C) earned by operating at C in the
previous i trials and selects the C with maximum reward as
the decision criterion for the next trial (C i+1) (if there are
multiple C with maximum reward, the learner chooses the
mean C). The algorithm is explained below: Initially, all
decision criteria (spanning the range of decision variable
values [dmin, dmax]) have equal reward scores (OC, R
0(C) = 0)
and hence are equally likely to be chosen. Upon observing
a value of the decision variable di on the ith trial, the
learner updates the score at each C with the reward earned by
operating at C (which is positive for a correct response and
negative for an incorrect response). The criterion for the
next trial, C i+1, is chosen as the one that yields maximum
reward Ri(C). The exact algorithm is given below:
Initialize : R0ðCÞ ¼ 0;OCZ dmin; dmaxf g
RiðCÞ ¼ Rij1ðCÞ þ rðC; di; TiÞ
rðC; di; 1Þ ¼ r11; if C G di; r10; else
rðC; di; 0Þ ¼ r00; if C 9 di; r01; else
Ciþ1 ¼ argmaxCðRiðCÞÞ:
ð5Þ
The finite memory learner is similar to the optimal
learner except that it has limited memory of the previous k
trials only (k Z {1,32,64,128}).
Figure 8. Optimal and bio learner. Panels (a)–(c) illustrate the functioning of the optimal learner. Initially, the reward earned by operating at all
decision criteria C is set to zero (R0(C) = 0, OC). After seeing a target present trial whose value of decision variable is d1, the reward score of
favorable decision criteria (C G d1) is incremented by the reward earned for correct detection or hit (r11), and reward score of unfavorable
decision criteria (C Q d1) is decremented by the penalty for missing the target (r10). The resulting reward scores R
1(C) is shown in black,
and the model selects the decision criterion corresponding to maximum reward score as its criterion for the next trial (C1; note: if there are
multiple decision criteria with maximum reward score, the model selects their mean). Upon seeing a target absent trial (decision variable
value d2), the model increments the reward score of favorable decision criteria (C 9 d2) by r00 (otherwise, decrements reward score by r01).
The new decision criterion after these 2 trials (C2) is chosen as the one with maximum reward score. Bio learner. Panel (d) illustrates how
the optimal model learner may be implemented neurally through gain modulation of a population of neurons encoding different decision
criteria. After each trial, the gain of neurons encoding favorable decision criteria is enhanced, while other neurons (tuned to unfavorable
decision criteria that will result in error responses) are suppressed. Further details are provided in the equations and main text.
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Bio learner (Figure 8) is a neurally plausible imple-
mentation of the optimal learner. We assume that the
optimal decision criterion is encoded by a population of
neurons (with Gaussian tuning curves) tuned to different
decision criteria. Upon seeing the ith display with a value
of decision variable di, all neurons whose preferred
decision criteria favor the correct response undergo
response gain enhancement proportional to the sum of
reward gained by correct response and penalty avoided by
incorrect response. The optimal decision criterion is set as
the preferred criterion of the most active neuron in the
population, read out through a winner-take-all competi-
tion. For simulation purposes, we implemented a popula-
tion of neurons with equi-spaced Gaussian tuning curves,
with standard deviation A = 0.25 and inter-neuron spacing
equal to A. This population consists of 33 neurons
representing values of C in [dmin, dmax]:
Initialize : g0ðCÞ ¼ 1;OCZ dmin; dmaxf g
giðCÞ ¼ ð1j !Þgij1ðCÞ þ !rðC; di;TiÞ
ðexponential smoothing factor !Þ
rðC; di; 1Þ ¼ ðr11 j r10Þ; if C G di; 0; else
rðC; di; 0Þ ¼ ðr00 j r01Þ; if C 9 di; 0; else









For each target frequency and reward scheme, we
computed the expected reward per trial (E[R], Equation 1)
and error bar (SEM, standard error of the mean reward per
trial) earned by the ideal observer (who operates at the
optimal decision criterion). The error bar is computed as




, where R is the mean reward
per trial, Ri is the reward in the ith trial, R is the reward per
trial, and N is the sample size. Rather than setting N to an
arbitrarily large number of iterations, to ensure a fair
comparison between the subjects and models, we set N to
be the number of trials performed by the subject in each
experimental condition, thus N = {300, 300, 1000} in the
50, 10, and 2% target frequency conditions, respectively.
We then simulated the models for 100 blocks of N trials
(300 trials for 50, 10%; and 1000 trials for 2% frequency).
On each trial, the decision variable (d) was drawn indepen-
dently from a target present distribution (P(dªT = 1)) with
probability P1 (0.5, 0.1, 0.02 depending on target fre-
quency) or from a target absent distribution (P(dªT = 0))
with probability (1 j P1). All learners were fed
the same pseudo-random sequences as input. The distribu-
tions P(dªT = 1) and P(dªT = 0) were determined from the
subjects’ ROC curve (Figure 3, see Comparing subjects and
ideal observers section for details on how to obtain these
distributions from subject’s data). The model’s decision
criteria evolved as a function of the values of the decision
variable in previously seen displays (see equations in
previous section). We determined the learning rate of each
model learner as the number of trials (or displays) taken by
the model to maximize expected reward (using a z-test to
determine statistical difference between model’s median
reward and ideal observer’s expected reward).
The learning curve of different models are shown in
Figure 9 for different target frequency and reward
schemes. Our simulations show that the optimal and bio
learners perform similarly across all target frequency and
reward conditions, consistently outperforming a unit
memory learner. In particular, the optimal and bio models
learn within 8, 16, and 2 trials (respectively) in the 50, 10
and 2% Neutral conditions; and within 16 and 64 trials in
the 10 and 2% Airport conditions. As shown in Table 2,
the trend in learning rates between humans and the models
is consistent. The learning rate of the optimal and bio
learners depends, intuitively, on the time taken to see a
single target present and target absent trialVthus, a
minimum of 2, 10, 50 trials are required on average for
the 50, 10, 2% target frequency conditions. However,
exceptions occur when the expected reward profile has a
flat peak. For example, in the 2% Neutral condition, the
expected reward profile has a flat peak (Figure 5e), so a
large range of decision criteria (yielding minimal false
alarm errors) are optimal as they maximize expected
reward. An average of a single target absent trial suffices
to shift the decision criterion near the optimal, so that
false alarm errors are minimized. Accordingly, Figure 9c
shows that the models are statistically indistinguishable
from the ideal observer after the first trial (there is an
increase in expected reward after 32 trials, but this is
small and non-significant). Thus, although at a first glance,
rapid learning within 2 trials in the 2% Neutral condition
(Figure 9c) seems counterintuitive (it is much less than the
average of 50 trials required to see a single target present
and absent trial), rapid learning occurs due to the flat peak
in the expected reward profile.
How much memory does a model need to learn as
rapidly as the optimal model? Is larger memory better? As
shown in Figure 9, we find that finite memory learners
with equal or greater memory capacity than the learning
rate of the optimal model perform equally well. The
longest learning rate of the optimal model is 64 trials
(in the 2% Airport condition). Thus, for the target
frequencies considered here (50, 10, 2%), a minimum of
64 trials in memory is required to perform as well as the
optimal learner with infinite memory. Although it may
seem intuitive that model performance should improve
with larger memory capacity, under our experimental
conditions (specific payoff structure and number of trials
per subject), we do not find any evidence to support this
hypothesis (comparison of the mean reward of two
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models with 128 or 64 trials in memory shows that the
models are statistically indistinguishable, p = 0.63 from a
t-test).
Discussion
To summarize, we investigated how reward outcomes
combine with sensory prior (or target frequency). Most
research has focused on medium and high priors like 10%
and 50% (Palmer et al., 2000; Treisman & Gelade, 1980),
ignoring low priors like 2% or less. However, such low
priors are critical in several searches like detection of rare
diseases in medical images (Gur et al., 2004) and
detection of bombs in airline passenger bags (Rubenstein,
2001). We investigated how reward outcomes combine
with a wide range of sensory priors (2, 10, 50%) to
influence decision criterion and target detection rates in
visual search. In our experiments under competitive
settings, we find that humans engaged in visual search
rapidly learn the optimal decision criterion that maximizes
expected reward per trial.
Our experimental results suggests that poor detection
rates in rare target searches (under the Neutral reward
scheme) are not due to subject’s fatigue (Parasuraman,
1986), carelessness, or lack of vigilance (Warm, 1993).







50% Neutral 14 8
10% Neutral 31 16
2% Neutral 7 2
10% Airport 24 16
2% Airport 42 64
Table 2. Learning the optimal decision criterion. The numbers
inside the boxes indicate the average number of trials taken by
four subjects and the optimal learner to maximize their expected
reward. See the text for details on how the learning rates of
subjects and the models are computed. Note that the subject’s
learning rate is computed from a single training sequence of 50
trials (in the 50, 10% target frequency condition) or 100 trials (in
the 2% target frequency condition) and depends on the values of
decision variable seen in that sequence (resulting in substantial
variability across subjects). Across all experimental conditions,
the trend in model’s learning rates and subjects is consistent.
Figure 9. Learning rates of models. The distributions of expected reward per trial, ER, for various model learners (color coded) over 1000
simulated blocks are shown as a function of the number of trials seen. Consider the example in Panel (a): The expected reward of the
ideal observer is shown in black (error bar represents the standard error of the mean). The different models are color coded (see legend).
The learning curves of all models (except the unit memory learner) are similar (they overlap with the yellow curve). The dashed vertical
line represents the number of trials t taken by the different models to learn to maximize ERVbelow t the model’s median ER is significantly
different from the ideal observer’s ER (z-test, significance level 0.05). In (a), the dashed vertical line in green shows that the unit memory
learner fails to learn the optimal decision criterion even after 256 trials, while the yellow dashed vertical line shows that all other models
learn to maximize their expected reward within 8 trials. As seen in (a)–(e), the bio and optimal models learn to maximize ER within 8, 16,
2, 16, and 64 trials in the 50, 10, 2% Neutral; and 10, 2% Airport conditions, respectively. Across all conditions, finite memory learners with
64 or larger trials in memory perform as well as the optimal and bio models.
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impair stimulus representation), as we find that a model
with fixed internal stimulus representation predicts sub-
jects’ data accurately by varying the decision criterion
only. Another account suggests that rare targets are missed
due to motor response errors (Fleck & Mitroff, 2007)
arising from repeated “no” responses in rare target
searches. However, this account fails to explain why such
motor errors are not observed for rare target searches
under the Airport reward scheme. A prominent account
suggests that rare targets are missed due to premature
abandoning of the search (Wolfe et al., 2005). While this
account can explain reaction time data in experiments
where the display remains until subjects terminate the
search, it is not applicable to our study where we do not
find any RT differences in response to a brief display
that automatically terminates after a short duration (100–
150ms).We offer an alternate account of the poor detection
performance in rare target searches (Neutral reward
scheme) by suggesting that subjects are deploying the
optimal strategy of maximizing their reward, which in rare
target searches is dominated by the reward in the more
frequent target absent trials. Hence, subjects shift their
decision criterion to commit fewer false alarm errors.
Previous studies did not find a noticeable effect of
reward on the detection rates (Green & Swets, 1966;
Healy & Kubovy, 1981; Kubovy & Healy, 1977; Lee &
Janke, 1964, 1965; Lee & Zentall, 1966; Maddox,
2002). They reported suboptimal effect of reward on the
decision criterion. In particular, these studies noted that 1)
the decision criterion was more conservative than the
optimal decision criterion, 2) the decision criterion was
closer to optimal when the target frequency changed, and
suboptimal when the reward scheme changed. One study
(Maddox, 2002) found that reward was less effective
than target frequency in shifting the decision criterion,
even at 25% target frequency. Another study conjectured
that reward structures that would be effective for rare
target searches (1–2% frequency) might exceed what is
practical in the laboratory (Wolfe et al., 2007). Yet
another concern is that the monetary reward in the
laboratory setting may not relate to the reward values in
the real-world scenario (e.g., getting fired from the job for
missing a bomb in airport baggage screening cannot be
quantified by an equivalent monetary value in the
laboratory; Wolfe et al., 2005). In Experiment 1, we
confirmed previous findings that reward payoff manipu-
lation has a suboptimal influence on the decision criterion
and does not yield significant improvement in target
detection rates. However, a potential flaw in the design
of previous studies is the lack of control for how subjects
perceived the reward (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Note
that the reward values rij (i, jZ{0, 1}) in Equation 1 may
not be perceived by the subjects as the objective reward
value (chosen by the experimenter). Non-linearity in
subject’s utility function such as diminished utility with
increasing wealth (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953)
may result in a gain of 10 points being perceived as less
than 10, resulting in weak reward incentives. Thus,
previously observed suboptimality (failure to maximize
expected reward) may be due to the non-linearity of
subject’s utility function. We avoided this confound by
rewarding subjects in a competitive setupVsubjects may
lose the contest even after earning 1000 points, hence to
win the contest, subjects must try to maximize the number
of points earned without slackening their effort or
diminishing their utility. Under such competitive settings
(Experiment 2), we find that subjects maximize expected
reward. Thus, the drop in detection performance as the
search targets become rare (Wolfe et al., 2005) can be
compensated for by changing the reward scheme (Equa-
tion 1 shows that reward and target frequency are
multiplied together and therefore should have equivalent
effects on observer’s behavior).
Our finding that subjects learn the optimal decision
criterion is interesting and different from previous reports;
however, it is of little practical value if subjects require
hundreds of practice trials to learn. Analysis of the
training data reveals a surprisingly rapid learning rate-
subjects learn to maximize expected reward within an
average of 14, 31, 7, 24, and 42 trials in the 50%, 10%,
2% Neutral, and 10%, 2% Airport conditions, respec-
tively. What are the underlying computational and neural
mechanisms of such rapid reward-based learning? One
possibility is to first estimate the statistics of stimulus
representation in the target present and absent displays,
then compute the expected reward profile as a function of
decision criteria (as in Equation 1) and use gradient ascent
(or other rules) to learn the optimal decision criterion that
maximizes expected reward. However, such a model
would require many trials to learn. Instead, we propose a
simple model that only requires knowledge of the sensory
observation and ground truth on the previous trial
(obtained via feedback on the reward) and uses an
incremental learning rule to update the reward score
earned so far by operating at different decision criteria. At
any instant, it selects the decision criterion with maximum
reward score. We show through simulations that this
model and its neural implementation learn the decision
criterion rapidly within a few trials (intuitively, the time to
see at least one target present and absent trial). Such rapid
learning raises interesting questions, such as whether
subjects can quickly adapt to displays where the target
frequency and reward payoffs change dynamically.
A potential application of our finding is the design of
reward schemes to improve detection rates of rare targets.
We demonstrate this in Figure 10. As the ideal observer
model provides a quantitative account of subject’s
behavior, we can use it to predict subject’s detection rates
for any reward policy or target frequency, by simply
knowing the subject’s ROC curve. Thus, the subject’s
ROC curve may be easily determined from 100 to 200
trials (e.g., using confidence rating procedures (Green &
Swets, 1966; Palmer et al., 2000) at 50% target frequency)
and used to predict subject’s detection rates in 2% target
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frequency conditions, which would otherwise require
1000 trials (for 20 target present trials).
The current study focuses on a paradigm where the
display automatically terminates after a brief exposure
(100–200 ms SOA). Under these conditions, we find that
subjects in a contest rapidly learn to maximize expected
reward. However, several real-world tasks (e.g., visual
screening of airline passenger bags for detecting danger-
ous weapons) involve displays that remain until the
subject chooses to terminate the search. Such settings
introduce speed-accuracy tradeoffs and interesting reac-
tion time effects on target detection rates (e.g., a recent
study (Wolfe et al., 2005) found that rare targets are
missed when the search is abandoned faster than the mean
time to find the target). It remains to be tested whether
subjects maximize expected reward per trial in such
reaction time settings.
Many cognitive decisions (e.g., whether to buy a stock
or not) are influenced by economic incentives. Such tasks
are complex, cognitive, deliberative, and often involve
suboptimal decision strategies (Kahneman & Tversky,
2000; e.g., loss aversion, risk aversion). In contrast, our
study focuses on simple, non-cognitive, early sensory
decisions such as whether we see a salient target or not;
under these conditions, we find that humans behave
optimally. Our finding that humans maximize expected
reward in sensory decision making complements recent
findings of optimality in rapid motor planning tasks
(Trommersha¨user, Maloney, & Landy, 2003). We also
find that humans learn the optimal decision criterion
rapidly within 50 trials during training and propose
neurally plausible models of such rapid reward-based
learning. Potential real-life applications of this study
include designing reward schemes to improve target
detection rates in life-critical searches.
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Figure 10. Designing reward schemes to obtain desired detection performance. This plot shows how the penalty r10 for missing a rare
target (2% frequency) may be changed (while maintaining other reward values constant) to obtain the desired detection performance. We
use the ROC curve obtained from Experiments A and B. For each reward policy in the 2% target frequency, we use the ideal observer
model to predict the false alarm and correct detection (hit) rates that maximize expected reward per trial. Our Airport reward scheme
shown by the vertical gray line (r10 = j900) yields detection rates of 71 T 15%. Even higher detection rates may be obtained by increasing
the miss penalties further (r10 G j10000) but at the expense of increasing false alarm rates.
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